Corporal William Edward "Bill" Althouse

William Edward “Bill” Althouse was born on April 15th, 1924 to David and Cora Althouse in Ronks, Pennsylvania, the 2nd of 3 children. Bill graduated from Strasburg Highschool in mid 1941 just months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He worked for a few months as a carpenter’s apprentice before enlisting on January 27th, 1942 just a few months shy of his 17th Birthday.

Althouse was sent to Parris Island, SC for his recruit training before he landed in Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines as a Field Telephone-man and code clerk. On August 27th, 1942, PFC Althouse and the freshly trained 1st Battalion, 7th Marines loaded onto the USS President Adams for their transport to their first engagement, Guadalcanal. The 7th Marines finally landed on Guadalcanal on September 18th, 1942 alongside a separate battalion from the 11th Marines and some additional support units, over a month after the first American units began combat operations on the island. Althouse, being a Field Telephone-man likely running field phone lines between different companies and the CP as well as manning the switchboard at Colonel Chesty Puller’s Command Posts.

The following summary of 1/7’s actions comes from the Marine Corps University Press’ “The Legend of Suicide Charley” by Major Gary Cozzens, USMCR (Ret):

Soon after arrival on Guadalcanal, Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s Marines participated in two major actions. The first occurred along the Matanikau River on 23 September along the northern portion of the Marines’ perimeter. After moving down the river, Companies A and B landed west of Point Cruz, near Honiara, an action in which the battalion executive officer, Major Otho Rogers, was killed. Captain Charles W. Kelly Jr., commanding officer of Company C, assumed Roger’s billet, and Captain Marshall W. Moore became the commanding officer of Charley Company.

 In a second action on 7–9 October, Charley Company acted as the main effort in a regimental-size attack, catching the Japanese 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, in a draw inflicting 700 casualties. After fighting along the Matanikau River, Puller’s Marines were assigned to defend the eastern half of Sector Three south of Henderson Field. Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, had been to the 1st Battalion’s right flank of Sector Three on the forward slope of Edson’s Ridge, but had redeployed on 23 October to the Matanikau River in anticipation of the next Japanese attack. As a result, Puller’s Marines assumed the defense for all of Sector Three in the 1st MarDiv’s perimeter, approximately 2,500 meters normally assigned to two infantry battalions.Leadership within the Marine ranks demonstrated the confidence the Marines brought to the situation. In addition to Moore, other leaders in Company C included First Sergeant Lewis C. Oleksiak; Gunnery Sergeant Charles Livelsberger; platoon commanders First Lieutenants Karl H. Schmidt Jr., Arthur H. Wyman, and Marine Gunner William Fleming (2d Platoon); and platoon Sergeants Robert L. Domokus (1st Platoon), London L. Traw (2d Platoon), and Simon Viger (3d Platoon).

Puller and Kelly discussed the employment of the battalion and decided Kelly would take one platoon from each rifle company with attached machine guns, and occupy the position vacated by Hanneken. The terrain was much more favorable for defense, and Puller and Kelly thought it could be held with fewer men. This method of filling in the gap proved to be fortuitous. Kelly was accompanied by Captain William Watson, the battalion S2 (intelligence), communicators, and a couple corpsmen. The composite company spent its time bringing in ammunition and supplies and familiarizing themselves with the defensive features of the area.

It was obvious to the Marines that a large-scale Japanese attack would be a real threat in the near future. Accordingly, Puller’s Marines improved the defensive line and registered the final protective line in the perimeter defense. Barbed wire was woven into double apron fences and hung with empty ration cans and items that would make a racket and expose attempts to breach the wire. Fields of fire were cleared for the automatic weapons and mortar and artillery targets were preregistered. The Marines also removed the machine guns from disabled airplanes at Henderson Field and incorporated them into the defensive fires.

All during the day of 24 October, Puller drove his men to complete their defensive positions. From left to right facing south, Puller’s defense consisted of Company A (Captain Regan Fuller), Company C (Captain Moore), Company B (Captain Robert H. Haggerty), and the composite company (Captain Kelly). The battalion’s weapons company, Company D (Captain Robert J. Rodgers), had machine guns attached to each line company. Master Gunnery Sergeant Ray Fowel’s 81mm mortars provided indirect fire support. A platoon of four 37mm antitank guns (used in an antipersonnel role) from Captain Joseph E. Buckley’s regimental weapons company also interspersed in the line. Several hundred yards in front of Company A’s position sat a combat outpost manned by platoon Sergeant Ralph Briggs’ platoon. To Company A’s left (east) was 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, an Army National Guard battalion from North Dakota and Minnesota. The point where Company A’s line joined the Army National guardsmen had been coined “Coffin Corner,” while the open area in front of the lines was called the “Bowling Alley.”

A trail ran through the center of Company C’s position that was protected by a cheval-de-frise, which in turn was set into a double apron of barbed wire. The Marines opened and closed this cheval-de-frise to allow patrols in and out through the perimeter. Sergeant John Basilone and his section of heavy water-cooled .30-caliber Browning machine guns from Company D were attached to Company C and emplaced in the company’s line. It was at this point that the major Japanese attack occurred on the night of 24 October. After only a month as company commander, Moore was now faced with establishing a defensive position with one-third of his company detached. On the afternoon of the attack, Moore sat in the company command post, feeling uneasy about the situation. He suggested that his Marines string another double apron of barbed wire behind the cheval-de-frise. At approximately 1600, they put on heavy gloves and strung more barbed wire, paying particular attention to the area behind the cheval-de-frise. The wire was strung in such a way as to make it very difficult to get through in the dark; so difficult, in fact, that a person would have to weave through. This tactic proved a great asset, as the Japanese apparently did not know it was there. Moore’s men also installed trip flares in the wire.

Throughout the line, foxholes were deepened, crew-served weapons positions prepared, targets registered, and tactical wire emplaced. Some fighting positions were large enough for three men and surrounded with sandbags, leaving only a window to shoot through and a crawl space in the rear through which to enter and exit. The fighting holes were then covered by laying coconut logs on the sandbags, with another tier of sandbags atop the logs.

Runners took messages from the battalion commander to the front lines where Company C was on the edge of the jungle. The company had cleared foliage in front of its positions about 100 yards into the jungle. In this stage of the war, Marines were using the M1903 Springfield .30-caliber rifles left over from World War I.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were not idle. A Marine on patrol saw a Japanese officer observing Henderson Field through field glasses. Another Marine observed a large amount of smoke, apparently from cooking fires, rising from the jungle floor in Lunga Valley, two miles south of Puller’s position. Unfortunately, those two pieces of information never reached Puller.

These Japanese soldiers of the 17th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake, were some of Japan’s finest, particularly the regiments of Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama’s 2d (Sendai) Division whose motto was “Duty is heavier than a mountain, but death is lighter than a feather.” Colonel Masajiro Furumiya’s 29th Infantry Regiment, followed by Colonel Toshiso Hiryasu’s 16th Infantry Regiment, would spearhead the attack by the Japanese left flank under the command of Major General Yumio Nasu. The right flank attack, under the command of Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, would consist of Colonel Akinosuka Oka’s 124th Infantry Regiment supported by Colonel Toshinari Shoji’s 230th Infantry Regiment. Kawaguchi balked at his orders to attack the right side of the Marines’ line and was relieved as the commander of the right wing by Colonel Shoji. According to General Hyakutake’s original plan, the attack was to occur on 18 October, but the intense jungle terrain and the uncooperative weather caused a postponement until the 22d that was later pushed back to the evening of 24 October.

As the Sendai Division approached from the south, it reached a point it believed to be about a mile south of Henderson Field by about 1400. With the attack set for 1900, the two wings of the division opened four trails through the jungle to the American lines. Rain began to fall about 1600 and intensified an hour later, causing chaos among the Japanese. Darkness further obscured their ability to navigate. Due to these difficulties, the Sendai Division missed its assigned attack time and was still moving north when the rain ended and the clouds opened up to reveal a brilliant full moon.

With darkness fast approaching, the Marines prepared for the coming onslaught. Lieutenant Colonel Puller ordered the lines on the field telephones to be left open for instant communications with subordinates. At approximately 2100, rain began to fall again, making the night even darker under the thick jungle canopy.

At 2130, the combat outpost from Company A reported to the battalion that it was surrounded by the Japanese. Puller directed them to push to their left (east) and return through 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, to Company A’s position if possible. A short time later, the Japanese taunted the Marines by yelling, “Blood for the Emperor!” and “Marine you die!,” in an attempt to entice them to give away their position. After more than a month on the island, Puller’s men were too wise to fire at the voices. Instead, they replied with their own taunt, “Blood for Franklin and Eleanor [Roosevelt].” Suddenly, at 2200 on 24 October, the Japanese came toward the Marines’ lines in a rush. Luckily for Captain Moore’s men, the cheval-de-frise in front of Company C’s position caught the Japanese by surprise and they were momentarily halted. Japanese records indicate that it was Colonel Shoji’s 1st Battalion, 230th Infantry, that hit Puller’s lines first on the right at 2200, running into Company A. They were followed by the whole of Major General Yumio Nasu’s left wing, attacking in a column of battalions. The 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, rapidly moved straight into the cheval-de-frise in front of Company C and was decimated.

Marine artillery and mortars were firing supporting missions in such volleys that the powder bags heated in the weapons and “cooked off” from hot barrels, causing “short rounds narrowly missing the Marine’s position.” Moore’s men had emplaced their barbed wire entanglements so securely that wave after wave of Japanese assault troops were hung up and died on it. The company eventually was infiltrated, but afterward, the Japanese seemed confused and made little effort to take advantage of the penetration.

At 0015 and again at 0300, General Marayama’s Sendai Division attacked in the most concentrated effort of the night. When the first wave came, the Marines kept firing and drove the Japanese back. Ammunition supplies were getting low, so Basilone left the guns and ran to his next gun position to get more. Upon his return, a runner arrived and told Basilone that the Japanese had broken through the emplacements on the right, killing two of the crew and wounding three, and the guns were jammed. Basilone moved up the trail and found 18-year-old Private Cecil H. Evans screaming at the Japanese to “come on.” Basilone returned to his own guns, grabbed one machine gun, and told the crew to follow him up the trail. While he cleared the jams on the other two guns, the Marines set up their weapons. The Japanese still coming at the lines pinned the Marines down at their positions. Basilone rolled over from one gun to another, firing as fast as they could be loaded. The ammunition belts were in bad shape because they had been dragged on the ground, forcing the gunners to scrape the mud out of the receiver. Still, some Japanese soldiers infiltrated behind the lines, so the Marines would have to stop firing and shoot at infiltrators with small arms. At dawn, the gun barrels were burnt out after Basilone’s machine gun section fired 26,000 rounds.

Company C was stretched out over a wide area in a very thin line that had been decimated by heavy casualties and illness. Sergeant Louis S. Maravelas of 2d Platoon and his squad were in position to the right of Basilone’s section protecting the guns, and in the confusion of the fight, they could not see to the right of the line. Firing was heavy and contact between platoons was very poor. Maravelas and his Marines fixed bayonets and returned fire. Basilone had the bodies of the dead Japanese piled two, three, and four high in front of his emplacement.

The Marines poured their fire into the Japanese attack, which was centered on Company C’s line. Pull- er telephoned Brigadier General Pedro A. Del Valle, commanding officer of the 11th Marines, requesting artillery support. The battalion’s operations officer, Captain Charles J. Beasley, called Colonel Gerald C. Thomas, the division chief of staff, requesting reinforcements.

As the situation became more serious, Lieutenant Colonel Julian N. Frisbie, the 7th Marines regimental executive officer, called Captain Kelly from the regimental command post 600 yards directly behind Kelly’s position and told the captain he was sending up a battalion of the U.S. Army’s 164th Infantry. He asked if Kelly could guide them into position in Puller’s area. Kelly told Frisbie he would have runners there by the time the Army troops got up to the lines. The fortunate result of Puller’s method of filling in the area Hanneken’s battalion had vacated with a platoon from each company position in Kelly’s area was that it was a simple matter for each platoon to send a man to Kelly, since they were thoroughly familiar with the location of their parent units and the access routes. The runners arrived at Kelly’s command post, where he briefed them on their task. Kelly then ordered Captain William Watson to take the guides to Frisbie’s position and to be sure that they each picked up an Army company to lead to their own company area. The 7th Marines chaplain, Father Matthew F. Keough, led the Army battalion into position with Marines from Captain Kelly’s position acting as guides to their parent companies. While the Army units moved forward, Company L, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced Company A; Company I, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced Company B; and Company K, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, reinforced Charley Company. All the Army companies were in position by 0345. The movement went smoothly and the reinforcements were fed in from behind the Marine company positions. The soldiers were fed into the line piecemeal rather than as tactical units.

From Kelly’s position on the ridge, it was readily apparent when the new troops were in position, as the sound and tempo of firing picked up significantly. The Army units were armed with M1 Garand .30-caliber rifles, which had a much higher rate of fire than the old Springfields used by the Marines. The sounds of the battle were deafening at times, only to diminish and then pick up again as the Japanese rolled back in. Up on the ridge, Captain Kelly felt he had a grand-stand seat—he could see the action laid out in front of him, though off to the left on the low ground, he could only guess at the progress of the battle. Puller called in all the available artillery, and Kelly heard it firing at such reduced range that its rounds were coming in close overhead—so close that a few short rounds landed behind Marine lines. Fortunately, no casualties resulted from friendly fire.

The next assault by the Japanese at about 0400 was somewhat unexpected in its execution. Marine and Army units were mixed into the line piecemeal. At daylight, although the American line had held, a small Japanese salient existed between Companies C and B, plus the infiltrators who had penetrated the lines.

One of the Marines leading reinforcements into the lines that night was Private Theodore G. West. Though wounded and unable to fight, West continued to maintain his position on the line and directed reinforcements into position and into the fight. His actions “contributed materially to restoring our line and to the eventual rout and virtual annihilation of an entire Japanese regiment.” For his actions, Private West was awarded the Navy Cross. In his official report of the battle, Puller stated that “the conduct of [A]rmy reinforcements on the night of 24–25 October were exemplary and they arrived just in time.”

Captain Kelly and his composite company also saw action on the night of 24 October, but not to the extent of the rest of the battalion. Kelly kept his phone lines open and tied into the battalion’s communication net to allow constant communication with Puller and the other frontline command posts. It was raining hard and pitch dark when the Japanese finally came to the wire, and they were massed when the order came to open fire. It could not have been a more ideal situation from a defensive standpoint. The Japanese piled up on the wire, mowed down as they advanced. They would back off to regroup and then, at the shouted urging of their officers, they would advance again in a banzai charge.

Miyazawa’s diary recorded that, when Japanese encountered the Marines, it was necessary to advance along a trail made by the Americans. The Marines had excellent detectors set up to announce Japanese movement, resulting in intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Even though it was night, the Marines had effective plots that inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese. However, the 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, commander strove to break through. Each company began its ordered assault, but because of the heavy concentration of mortar and machine-gun fire, the attempt was delayed. About this time, the regimental commander, Colonel Masajiro Furumiya with 7th Company, penetrated the Marines’ position, but made no progress. Finally, dawn broke and American fire became more intense, almost annihilating the 3d Battalion. According to Miyazawa, Japanese battle losses at the mukade were estimated at 350 killed, 500 wounded, and 200 missing for a total of 1,050.

All night on 24 October, the Japanese hit Company C with a regiment of troops in waves of suicidal attacks. They threw their bodies into the machine gun emplacements, forcing the gunners to evacuate the bunkers and fire from the top. During the night, Marines transported ammunition to the frontlines.

One Company C machine gun emplacement on the right side burned out the lands and grooves of two air-cooled .30-caliber barrels for their machine gun. The 2d Platoon sergeant, London Traw, was on the right with a water-cooled .30-caliber machine gun. He was blown up with Japanese dynamite and killed that night.

The medical personnel in the battalion aid station cared for the wounded under exceedingly adverse conditions. They worked in virtual darkness and heavy rain amid tremendous battle noises to save the most severely wounded.

At approximately 0500, a small group of Japanese from the 7th Company, 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry, broke through the Marine lines and drove a salient between Companies B and C. The penetration was quickly sealed, and Company C held the line throughout the night despite multiple Japanese attacks. Thirty-seven Japanese were killed, reducing the salient, and more died in the rear of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, line the following day during the mopping-up effort led by First Lieutenants Arthur H. Wyman and Karl Schmidt and Sergeant Robert L. Domokos. After sunrise, the Japanese mounted one more serious attack, but were easily beaten back.

Private Ralph Tulloch of the regimental weapons company had gone to sleep in the back of an open truck. Upon being awakened, he was ordered to the ammo dump and picked up a load to take to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Tulloch had not been to 1st Battalion’s position and asked if someone at the ammo dump would ride shotgun to guide the way. The normal route was under enemy attack.

With as much ammo as he could stow in the truck, Tulloch slowly left the ammo dump. He turned left on a trail at the foot of Bloody Ridge and headed into the jungle east toward 1st Battalion’s lines. Heavy rain continued, though an occasional sliver of moonlight helped guide the driver. At the base of Bloody Ridge, the ground was slippery with mud, and water stood a foot deep.

It was now 0300 on 25 October, and the main attack of the Japanese focused on Company C’s position. With tracers and the sound of rounds from Japanese machine guns overhead and debris from the trees falling, Tulloch struggled against his instinct to stop and find cover. After some time driving in blackness, Tulloch turned on the blackout lights, but they did not help. He stopped the truck and picked up a piece of wood that gave off what he called foxfire. He asked the guide to walk on the left side of the trail holding the foxfire where he could see it along the trail.

Tulloch passed what he later learned was 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, moving along the trail to reinforce Puller’s battalion. He was stopped by someone from the battalion command post, who asked him to unload part of the machine gun and rifle ammo there. Tulloch and the guide carried some to the front lines a short distance away to supply the machine guns for Sergeant Basilone, while the rifle ammo was placed under a poncho at the Company C command post.

The truck slid off the trail at the base of the ridge, leaving Tulloch’s vehicle mired in mud, with all four wheels spinning. Trapped inside the vehicle, he could not get out and a sniper started firing at him. Three or four rounds hit the truck bed and ricocheted. One round hit the lower left corner of the windshield, forcing Tulloch to take cover in front of the truck and return fire blindly in the general direction of the sniper. After about 30 minutes of quiet, Tulloch managed to get the truck out and go after another load of mortar, 37mm, rifle, and machine gun ammo, water, and rations, which he delivered at daylight.

The Marines exacted a heavy toll in the Battle for Henderson Field. Major General Yumino Nasu (commander of the left wing), Colonel Yoshi Hiroyasu (16th Infantry), and Colonel Masajiro Furumiya (29th Infantry) were killed in action. Japanese reports account for more than 1,050 killed, missing, or wounded from the 29th Infantry alone. American figures showed 250 dead Japanese were found within the 1st Battalion’s lines, 25 of whom were officers. A total of 1,462 dead Japanese were counted in front of the battalion’s position. Another account states that after the night of attacks, more than 400 Japanese were counted in the cone of machine gun fire in front of Company C’s position; they were buried in a common grave.

Kamekichi Kusano, a 23-year-old private in 7th Company, 2d Battalion, 29th Regiment, wrote: “The 29th [Infantry] attacked the first day and was led into a trap and the majority of the regiment was killed. The dead were piled three and four deep. Only two or three hundred survived the attack.”

John Stannard, then a sergeant in Company E, 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, recalled that “the carnage of the battlefield was a sight that perhaps only the combat infantryman, who has fought at close quarters, could fully comprehend and look upon without a feeling of horror.”

At daylight the next morning, the front lines revealed a stack of dead Japanese piled up in front of Company C’s position. The U.S. Army was left to clean up and quickly bury the dead to prevent diseases. Korean prisoners, whom the Japanese had brought onto the island as forced labor, were assigned to bury the Japanese dead. Marine engineers blew three holes in front of Company A’s old position, and in three days, the Koreans buried more than 700 dead Japanese.

Casualties for Puller’s battalion were 19 dead, 30 wounded, and 12 missing. Company C’s casualties were 9 dead and 9 wounded. To date, the battalion had suffered 24 percent casualties and 37 percent officer casualties on Guadalcanal. Puller later summed up the fight: “We held them because we were well dug in, a whole regiment of artillery was backing us up, and there was plenty of barbed wire.” When the Marines were relieved by the soldiers and sent to new positions farther up on Bloody Ridge, they all were equipped with the new M1 Garand rifles instead of their issued Springfield bolt-action rifles. Soon after, however, a directive ordered the return of the M1 rifles to the Army and the Marines got their old Springfields back.

The 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, relieved Puller from perimeter defense and he shifted his battalion on the ridge, so what was left of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, now occupied the position previously held by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. The rain stopped and sunlight hit the ridge, giving the Marines a chance to dry out and rest. That night, the Japanese tried a repeat performance, with their main effort coming at the same area as before, though now occupied by 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry. They made desultory attempts on 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ new position on the ridge, a few straggled down the bank of the Lunga River, and some were simply laggards who were lost. At 0800 on 26 October, General Hyakutake ordered his forces to retreat.

PFC Althouse was credited for combat actions on September 18th under bombardment near the mouth of the Lunga River, September 19-20 skirmishes with Japanese forces around the Pioneer bridge on the Lunga River, September 24th combat patrol around the Mambulo River, October 7-8 combat operations west of the Matanikau, October 24-25 defense of sector #3 in the Lunga area, November 4th combat near the Malimbiu River, and November 8-9 combat west of the Metapona river.

The battalion next conducted offensive operations at Koli Point in November before withdrawing from Guadalcanal in December 1942 and deploying to Australia for recovery.

After the 1st Marine Division’s infamous R&R period in Australia, Althouse, now a Corporal, and the rest of 1/7 loaded aboard the S.S. John Whiteaker on September 26th, 1943 to set sail for Cape Gloucester. Corporal Althouse and 1/7 landed on Cape Gloucester December 26th, 1943 and fought through ceaseless rain and unforgiving muddy jungles. At 89, speaking on Cape Gloucester, "We were wet all the time," Althouse recalled. "Our socks rotted on our feet." Althouse and 1/7 played a key role in engagements around Aogiri Ridge, Target Hill, and Suicide Creek, until 4 months later they were able to leave the island for their R&R on Pavuvu.

Corporal Althouse proceeded to build up the island of Pavuvu as a new base for the First Marine Division while they rested, trained, and received replacements for their next landing.

On September 15th, 1944, Corporal Althouse and the 7th Marines loaded into amphibious tractors from the deck of the USS Ormsby and set off for Orange Beach Three.

On the extreme right of the division front, the 7th Marines planned to land two battalions in column on Beach Orange 3, the remaining battalion (2/7) being kept afloat as division reserve. The scheme of maneuver called for the leading unit, the 3d Battalion, to drive across to the eastern shore in conjunction with the 5th Marines in order to split the island's defenders. The 1st Battalion, landing immediately behind, was to wheel to the right in line and commence the drive against the Japanese thus isolated in the southern pocket, 3/7 wheeling to move abreast once the island had been crossed.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, had come in behind 3/7 as planned, landing on Orange 3 at 1030. By this time some of the early confusion on the beaches had been resolved, but the 1st Battalion encountered many of the difficulties that had plagued the 3d and a portion of its personnel likewise landed on Orange 2. Resistance was described as "light, except for heavy mortar fire" until about 1200. But as the battalion began wheeling southward in accordance with its mission, enemy resistance stiffened notably and the terrain became increasingly difficult. It was discovered that a dense swamp, which did not appear on the operational map, blocked a large portion of the right half of the battalion's zone of action. The single trail skirting its west fringe, in Company C's area, was strongly defended by enemy pillboxes and bunkers. Company A, groping around the swamp to the east, eventually extended itself some 250 yards into the 3d Battalion's zone. Company B was employed to tie-in the flanks of Companies C and A, but not until 1520 was Colonel Gormley able to announce the seizure of the intermediate phase line designated 0-A. During the night the Japanese staged a strong counterattack from the swamp, necessitating the alerting of shore party personnel to serve as a mobile reserve in case of necessity. Fifty of the enemy were killed in this action. When reports from shore indicated that the two battalions committed in the south would almost certainly fall short of the ambitious objective planned for the first day, General Rupertus, still aboard USS Dupage, became seriously concerned over this apparent loss of forward momentum. Shortly before noon he ordered the Division Reconnaissance Company ashore as a reinforcement, and a little later, after some rather ambiguous communication with officers on the scene, attempted to commit the division reserve for -the same purpose." The order to dig in for the night reached the front line units in the southern zone about 1700.49 Gains, in relation to the optimistic predictions, were disappointing. The 1st Battalion was on the 0-A line, as was the right of the 3d Battalion (Company K) ; but Company I, still held up before the strongpoint to its front because of the delay in the tanks coming up, was 400 yards short of the intermediate objective. And the still-open gap in the middle of 3/5 on the left constituted a potent threat to the entire southward-facing line. However, the tactical situation was more propitious than it appeared to the minds of those in the division command post, still afloat, and little genuine concern was felt by the officers commanding ashore. Local counterattacks, hampered by extensive illuminations by naval star shells and harassing fire by the 11th Marines, were beaten off during the night without undue difficulty, and the coming of daylight saw a quick rectification of the worst difficulties.

At the end of a bloody first hour, all five battalions were ashore. The closer each battalion was to Umurbrogol, the more tenuous was its hold on the shallow beachhead. During the next two hours, three of the division's four remaining battalions would join the assault and press for the momentum General Rupertus deemed essential.

Corporal Althouse fought with C Company almost an entire month across Peleliu in areas like Bloody Nose Ridge, The Horseshoe, and all throughout the Umorbrogols. Miraculously, he survived the battle without any major wounds. He and C Company left Peleliu on October 20th, 1944 and by November 1944 he was back in San Diego, CA.

In December 1944, Corporal Althouse was transferred to a training unit for training new field radio operators and signalmen. On September 17th, 1945, Corporal William Althouse was discharged from the Marine Corps at the age of 20. Of the 130 men in his company when the war began, Althouse was one of only two not killed or wounded.

He married Gloria, his wife, on Sept. 11, 1948. Bill was a faithful member of Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, Manheim, where he served as an usher, on church council, and on the property and building committee. He was a carpenter and in 1955 moved his family from the home he built in Strasburg into the new home he built in Manheim where he and Gloria remained until moving into Masonic Village in 2010. He worked for various construction companies over the years before retiring from Penway Construction, Manheim. Bill was a lifetime member of the Manheim Historical Society where he helped move the Keath House and restore the Trolley. An avid hunter and trap shooter, he was also a lifetime member of the Manheim Sportsmen’s Association where he held all office positions over the years. He was a member of the Manheim Masonic Lodge #587, and was an avid card player. Bill passed away September 21st, 2020 at the age of 96, leaving behind his wife and two daughters.